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random errors when they compute expected utilities. Errors are drawn from the normal 
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is higher for lotteries with a wider range of possible outcomes. It converges to zero for lotteries 
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the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. The model fits the data from ten 
well-known experimental studies at least as good as cumulative prospect theory. 
 
Keywords: decision theory, stochastic utility, expected utility theory, cumulative prospect theory 
JEL Classification codes: C91, D81 
                                                 
† I am grateful to Christian Ewerhart, Wolfgang Köhler and Andreas Ortmann for helpful comments. John Hey and 
Chris Orme generously provided their experimental data. Ganna Pogrebna helped a lot with English proofreading. 
 2
A stochastic expected utility theory 
 
“Perhaps we should now spend some time on thinking about 
the noise, rather than about even more alternatives to EU?” 
Hey and Orme (1994), Econometrica 62, p.1322 
1. Introduction 
Expected utility theory or EUT (e.g. von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) is a 
compelling normative decision theory in choice under risk (e.g. Knight, 1921). However, 
persistent violations of EUT, such as the Allais paradox (e.g. Allais, 1953), make EUT a 
descriptively inadequate theory (e.g. Camerer, 1995). Many theories have been proposed to 
improve the descriptive fit of EUT by introducing a few extra parameters and relaxing some of 
EUT axioms (see Starmer, 2000, for a review). Though no clear successor of EUT emerged (e.g. 
Harless and Camerer, 1994; Hey and Orme, 1994), a decision theory that explains the largest 
fraction of the empirical evidence appears to be cumulative prospect theory or CPT (e.g. Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992). 
This paper takes a new approach to explain the violations of EUT through the role of 
random errors. Camerer (1989), Starmer and Sugden (1989) and Wu (1994) provide extensive 
experimental evidence that there is some degree of randomness in the observed individual 
preference between lotteries. In a repeated choice between the same two lotteries (with a 
possibility of indifference) individuals make identical decisions only in around 75% of all cases 
(e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994). In other words, decision making under risk is inherently stochastic. 
The model presented in this paper describes the decisions of individuals who make random 
errors when they compute the expected utility of a lottery. The reexamination of experimental 
evidence reveals that the predictive power of this simple model is at least as good as that of CPT. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A stochastic expected utility theory 
or StEUT is described in section 2. Section 3 demonstrates how StEUT explains all major 
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stylized empirical facts such as the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (e.g. 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). StEUT and CPT are contested against each other in section 4 
using the data from ten well-known experimental studies. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theory 
Let ! "nn pxpxL ,;..., 11  denote a lottery that delivers an outcome ix  with probability ip , 
# $ni ,1% . Furthermore, let 1x  ( nx ) be the lowest (highest) outcome such that 01 &p  ( 0&np ). 
The stochastic expected utility of lottery ! "nn pxpxL ,;..., 11  is given by equation (1). 
! " ! " L
n
i
ii xupLU '() *
)1
  (1) 
Utility function RR: +u  is defined over changes in wealth rather than absolute wealth 
levels, as proposed by Markowitz (1952). An error term L'  is independently and normally 
distributed with a zero mean. Although the distribution of individual random errors is unknown, 
the distribution of random errors averaged across the subjects converges to the normal 
distribution due to the Central Limit Theorem. Thus, at least for the aggregate data, the normal 
distribution is a reasonably justifiable assumption. The specification of an error term (1) also 
appears in Hey and Orme (1994, p.1301) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999). 
The stochastic expected utility of a lottery cannot be less than the utility of the lowest 
possible outcome (see, however, Gneezy et al., 2004). Similarly, it cannot exceed the utility of 
the highest possible outcome. Therefore, the normal distribution of an error term is truncated so 
that ! " ! " ! "nL
n
i
ii xuxupxu ,(, *
)
'
1
1 . Specifically, the probability density function of an error 
term L'  is given by equation (2). 
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where ! "*
)
)
n
i
iiL xup
1
5  is the expected utility of a lottery and ! ".3  is the cumulative density 
function of the normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation L7 . 
The standard deviation of random errors L7  has two properties. First, ceteris paribus, the 
standard deviation of random errors is higher for lotteries with a wider range of possible 
outcomes. Second, the standard deviation of random errors converges to zero for lotteries 
converging to a degenerate lottery, i.e. # $niLpi ,1,0lim1 %8)+ 7 . The stochastic expected utility of a 
degenerate lottery that delivers an outcome ix  for certain is uniquely determined as ! "ixu . In this 
case the stochastic component L'  in equation (1) disappears. Two properties of the standard 
deviation of random errors together with equations (1)-(2) complete the description of StEUT. 
Obviously, when the standard deviation of random errors is zero for all lotteries, StEUT 
coincides with the deterministic EUT. 
3. Explanation of the stylized facts 
Having described the building blocks of StEUT, this section explores how this simple 
model explains theoretically the major stylized empirical facts. Subsection 3.1 below provides 
intuition behind the StEUT explanation of the most famous example of EUT violations—the 
Allais paradox. Subsections 3.2, 3.3, 3.5 and 3.5 present technical results demonstrating that 
StEUT predicts correspondingly the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, the generalized common 
consequence effect (of which the Allais paradox is one specific example), the common ratio 
effect and the violation of betwenness. 
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3.1. The Allais paradox 
The Allais paradox refers to the choice pattern ! " ! "1.0,105;89.0,10;01.0,01,10 66261 9LL !  
and ! " ! "11.0,10;89.0,01.0,105;9.0,0 6162 LL :9: ! , which is frequently found in the empirical studies 
(e.g. Slovic and Tversky, 1974). Deterministic EUT cannot explain this choice pattern (e.g. Allais, 
1953). Figure 1 demonstrates how StEUT explains the Allais paradox. The horizontal axis is the 
subjective utility scale ranging from ! "0u  to ! "6105 9u . The utility of lottery 1L  is deterministic 
and it is uniquely determined as ! "610u . It is assumed that ! " ! " ! " ! "666 10105010 uuuu 1921 . The 
stochastic expected utility of lottery 2L  is represented on figure 1 by a solid probability density 
function (PDF) of the normal distribution with mean ! " ! "66 1051.01089.0 99(9 uu . Similarly, ! "1LU :  
is depicted by a doted PDF of the normal distribution with mean ! "61011.0 u9  and ! "2LU : —by a 
dashed PDF of the normal distribution with mean ! "61051.0 99u . For demonstration purposes, it is 
assumed that ! " ! "66 1011.01051.0 uu 9299 , i.e. the mode of the dashed distribution is greater than 
the mode of the dotted distribution and the mode of the solid distribution is greater that ! "610u . 
PDF of U(L2)
PDF of U(L1')
PDF of U(L2')
 
Figure 1 StEUT and the Allais paradox 
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The distributions of ! "2LU  and ! "2LU :  have the same standard deviation because 2L  and 
2L:  have the same range of possible outcomes (from zero to five million). However, the 
distribution of ! "1LU :  has a lower standard deviation because lottery 1L:  has a narrower range of 
possible outcomes (from zero to one million). For lotteries 2L , 1L:  and 2L: , the highest 
probability attached to an outcome is correspondingly 0.89, 0.89 and 0.9. These probabilities are 
nearly identical. Thus, if the variance of random errors decreases because lotteries 2L , 1L:  and 
2L:  approach to a degenerate lottery, this effect is nearly identical for all three lotteries. 
The distribution of ! "2LU  is truncated more severely from the upper bound than from the 
lower bound because its mode ! "610u  is located closer to the upper bound ! "6105 9u  than to the 
lower bound ! "0u . Thus, for lottery 2L  the realization of a random error is more likely to 
decrease its utility rather than increase it. Although the mode of the distribution of ! "2LU  is 
greater than ! "610u , the mean of the distribution of ! "2LU  can be lower than ! "610u . In other 
words, lottery 1L  may be preferred to lottery 2L  because random errors are more likely to 
undervalue the utility of 2L  rather than overvalue it.  
The distributions of ! "1LU :  and ! "2LU :  are truncated more severely from the lower bound 
than from the upper bound because their corresponding modes ! "61011.0 u9  and ! "61051.0 99u  are 
located closer to the lower bound ! "0u  than to the upper bound ! "6105 9u . For lotteries 1L:  and 
2L:  the realization of a random error is more likely to increase rather than decrease their utilities. 
Due to truncation, the distribution of ! "1LU :  loses a longer lower tail then the distribution of 
! "2LU : . However, the distribution of ! "1LU :  has a smaller standard deviation, i.e. its tails are 
thinner. An overall relative effect is ambiguous. Random errors can overvalue the utility of 1L:  to 
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a greater extent than 2L:  (which is compatible with the Allais paradox) and vise versa (which 
may refute the Allais paradox). Thus, 2L:  may be preferred to 1L:  when simultaneously 1L  is 
preferred to 2L . 
Notice, that the occurrence of the Allais paradox can be reduced if lottery 1L  delivers 
almost one million (not with certainty). In this case the utility of 1L  is no longer deterministic 
and it becomes affected by random errors. Similarly as for lottery 2L , random errors are more 
likely to undervalue the utility of 1L  rather than overvalue it. Thus, for lotteries 1L  and 2L  the 
relative impact of random errors becomes of a second order and the Allais paradox can 
disappear. Conlisk (1989) provides empirical evidence supporting this prediction: the Allais 
paradox disappears when lotteries involved in the paradox are shifted inside the probability 
triangle (e.g. Marschak, 1950; Machina, 1982). Subsection 4.8 below discusses how StEUT fits 
the actual experimental evidence reported in Conlisk (1989) 
3.2. The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes 
The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes refers to an empirical observation that individuals 
often exhibit risk aversion when dealing with probable gains or improbable losses. The same 
individuals often exhibit risk seeking when dealing with improbable gains or probable losses 
(e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). One of the implications of the fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes is that individuals can simultaneously purchase insurance and public lottery tickets. The 
latter paradoxical observation was the first descriptive challenge for the deterministic EUT (e.g. 
Friedman and Savage, 1948).  
To demonstrate how StEUT explains the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, it is necessary 
first to calculate the certainty equivalent (or subjective price) of an arbitrary lottery L  according 
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to StEUT. By definition, the certainty equivalent is such an outcome CE that ! " ! "! "LUECEu ) . 
Using equation (1) this definition can be rewritten as equation (3). 
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Inserting equation (2) into (3) and simplifying the algebra, we obtain equation (4). 
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Let ! " ! ";
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 denote the certainty equivalent of lottery L 
according to the deterministic EUT. Equation (4) then implies that 
! " 01
lim
)+
2
LL
CECE
xu 75
 and 
! " 0
lim
)+
4
LnL
CECE
xu 75
.1 In other words, random errors overvalue the certainty equivalent (4) of a 
lottery whose expected utility L5  is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome ! "1xu . At 
the same time, random errors undervalue the certainty equivalent (4) of a lottery whose expected 
utility is close to the utility of the highest possible outcome ! "nxu . 
If utility function ! ".u  is concave then ! " **
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1
)
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. In other 
words, an individual with concave utility function is always risk averse according to the 
deterministic EUT. According to StEUT, an individual with concave utility function is always 
risk averse when the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the highest possible 
                                                 
1 This result follows directly from equation (4). The difference ! "! " ! "! "LLn xuxu 55 13113 1  is always greater 
than zero and the difference 
! "! " ! "! "
2
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1  is greater (lower) than zero when ! "1xuL )5  
( ! "nL xu)5 ). 
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outcome. In this case, 
! " *
)
)+
44
n
i
iixu
xpCECE
LnL 1
0
lim
75
. When the expected utility of a lottery is 
close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome, i.e. ! "1xuL +5  the prediction of StEUT is 
ambiguous. An individual with concave utility function may be risk seeking when random errors 
overvalue the certainty equivalent (4) so that *
)
2
n
i
ii xpCE
1
 although *
)
)
4
n
i
ii xpCE
L
1
07
. 
Similarly, according to the deterministic EUT an individual with convex utility function 
is always risk seeking. According to StEUT an individual with convex utility function is always 
risk seeking when the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the lowest possible 
outcome. He or she may be risk averse when the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility 
of the highest possible outcome. Risk aversion occurs when random errors undervalue the 
certainty equivalent of a lottery below its expected value though in the absence of any error the 
certainty equivalent of a lottery is above its expected value. 
To summarize, both for concave and convex subjective utility functions StEUT admits 
the incidence of risk seeking (risk aversion) for lotteries whose expected utility is close to the 
utility of the lowest (highest) possible outcome. In the terminology of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) a lottery whose expected utility is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome is 
called either an improbable gain or a probable loss. Similarly, a lottery whose expected utility is 
close to the utility of the highest possible outcome is called either a probable gain or an 
improbable loss. Therefore, StEUT is able to explain the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. 
Subsection 4.1 below discusses how StEUT fits the actual experimental evidence of the fourfold 
pattern of risk attitudes reported in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
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3.3. Generalized common consequence effect 
The common consequence effect is the following empirical observation. There exist pairs 
of lotteries ! "rpxrpxS (11 ,;1, 21  and ! "qxrxrqxR ,;;1, 3,21 11 , such that an individual prefers 
S to R if pr 1) 1  and the same individual prefer R to S if 0)r  (e.g. Slovic and Tversky, 1974; 
MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979). The Allais paradox is a special case of the common 
consequence effect when 11.0,105,10,0 63
6
21 )9))) pxxx  and 1.0)q  (e.g. Starmer, 2000).  
The generalized common consequence effect refers to the following two empirical 
observations. First, there exist lotteries S and R with probabilities p and q close to zero such that 
when probability r decreases from p11  to zero the fraction of individuals who prefer S over R 
first decreases and then increases (e.g. Wu and Gonzalez, 1996). Second, there exist lotteries 
! "rtxrpxptxS 11(1: 1,;,;, 321  and ! "rqxrxqxR 11: ,;,;1, 321  with probabilities p and q11  
close to zero such that when probability r decreases from t11  to zero the fraction of individuals 
who prefer S over R first increases and then decreases (e.g. Wu and Gonzalez, 1998). Intuitively, 
when the probability mass is shifted from the medium outcome to the lowest possible outcome, 
the choice of a riskier lottery becomes first more likely and then—less likely. This pattern is 
reverse when the probability mass is shifted from the medium outcome to the highest outcome. 
To demonstrate how StEUT explains the common consequence effect, it is necessary first 
to calculate the probability of choosing lottery S over R in a binary choice. According to equation 
(1), CRS ! RRSS '5'5 (2( . Thus, ! " ! " ! "dvvprobvprobRSprob RSRA
(B
B1
1(49)) 55''! . 
The last equation becomes (5) when we substitute for the probability density function from (2). 
! " ! "D E! " ! "D E! "! "! " ! "! "! " ! "! " ! "! "! "! "
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2
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2
!  (5) 
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where L3  is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution with zero mean and a 
standard deviation L7  and 
Lx1  (
L
nx ) is the lowest (highest) possible outcome of lottery D ERSL ,% . 
The lotteries involved in the generalized common consequence effect are constructed in 
such a way that the range of possible outcomes of one lottery ( S  and S : ) is always within the 
range of possible outcomes of the other lottery ( R  and R: ). Therefore, when  
! " ! "# $SSnSS xuxuv 55 11% ,1  we can infer that ! "D E RSRRnRS vxuv 55555 1()11( ,min  and 
! "D E ! " RRRRRS xuxuv 5555 1)11( 11,min . Plugging these results into equation (5) and 
simplifying algebra yields equation (6). 
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Consider now how the shift of the probability mass from the medium to the lowest 
possible outcome affects ! "RSprob !  given by equation (6). In the simplest case when S and R 
have the same expected utility ( RS 55 ) ) and the same standard deviation of random errors 
( RS 77 ) ), equation (6) implies that ! "
! "! " ! "! "
! "! " ! "! " 2
1
2
1
13
12 4
13113
13113
)
RRRR
RRRR
xuxu
xuxuRSprob
55
55
! . 
Therefore, an individual prefers R to S when RS 55 )  and RS 77 ) . Notice that lottery R has a 
wider range of possible outcomes than lottery S. According to the assumption of StEUT, this 
implies that ceteris paribus RS 77 4 . However, when the probability mass is shifted to the 
lowest possible outcome, R converges to a degenerate lottery (given that a fixed probability q 
attached to the highest outcome is small). According to another assumption of StEUT,  R7  then 
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converges to zero. Therefore, we may observe that RS 77 )  only when the probability mass is 
shifted to the lowest possible outcome. All together this implies that StEUT predicts preference 
SR !  when R and S have the same expected utility and the probability mass is shifted to the 
lowest outcome (so that RS 77 ) ).  
When R and S have the same expected utility ( RS 55 ) ) and the probability mass is 
shifted to the medium outcome, it must be the case that RS 77 4  because R has a wider range of 
possible outcomes and, moreover, S converges to a degenerate lottery, i.e. S7  converges to zero. 
When the probability mass is shifted to the medium outcome, the expected utility of S converges 
to the utility of the medium outcome, which is simultaneously the highest possible outcome of 
lottery S, i.e. ! "SnS xu+5 . It is always possible to find S5 , sufficiently close to ! "Snxu , such that 
equation (7) holds. 
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 (7) 
The intuition is the following. When ! "SnS xu+5  the integration is conducted primarily 
over the interval in which 04v . For 04v  the cumulative density function ! "vR3  with a higher 
standard deviation is located above the cumulative density function ! "vS3  with a lower standard 
deviation, i.e. ! " ! "vv SR 323 .  
Plugging result (7) into equation (6) and simplifying the algebra yields 
! " ! "! " ! "! " ! "! "! "! " ! "! "RRRR
RRS
S
SS
S
nS
xuxu
xuxuxuRSprob
55
555
13113
13113(13
F
13
11 2
2
1
! . Thus, ! " 5.02RSprob ! , 
i.e. an individual prefers S to R if and only if inequality (8) holds. 
! "! " ! "! " ! "! " ! "! "RRRRSSSSSnS xuxuxuxu 5555 13(13213(13 131  (8) 
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When ! " ! "! " 213 xuxuR (25  the right hand side of (8) is always less than unity. 
However, when S7  converges to zero the left hand side of (8) converges to unity. In this case 
inequality (8) would always hold. Therefore, StEUT predicts preference RS !  when R and S 
have the same expected utility ! " ! "! " 213 xuxuRS (2) 55  and the probability mass is shifted to 
the medium outcome (so that 0+S7 ). In a degenerate case when lottery S delivers the medium 
outcome 2x  for certain ( pr 1)1 ), we have ! "
! "! " ! "! "
! "! " ! "! "RRRR
RRRR
xuxu
xuxuRSprob
55
55
13113
13113
)
13
12!  
and S is preferred to R if and only if ! "! " ! "! " ! "! "! " 2132 RRRRRR xuxuxu 555 13(13213 . 
Notice that when the probability mass is shifted to the lowest possible outcome so that 
lottery R converges to a degenerate lottery (probability q is small), S7  converges to zero. In this 
case it is possible that SR 77 4 . Additionally, when the probability mass is shifted to the lowest 
possible outcome the expected utility of S converges to the utility of the lowest outcome, i.e. 
! "SS xu 1+5 . Thus, in the right hand side of equation (6) the integration is conducted primarily 
over the interval in which 02v . For 02v  the cumulative density function ! "vR3  with a lower 
standard deviation is located above the cumulative density function ! "vS3  with a higher 
standard deviation, i.e. ! " ! "vv SR 323 . Therefore, ! "RSprob !  when SR 77 4  is higher than 
! "RSprob !  when SR 77 ) , and an individual may prefer S to R. To summarize, when lotteries 
S and R have the same expected utility and the probability mass is shifted from the medium to 
the lowest outcome, StEUT predicts that ! "RSprob !  first decreases, but then it may increase. 
Intuitively, when the probability mass is allocated to the medium outcome, which is close 
to the highest possible outcome in terms of individual’s utility, an individual prefers S to R. 
Utility of S is deterministic (not affected by random errors). However, random errors are likely to 
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undervalue the utility of R. When the probability mass is allocated to the lowest possible 
outcome, random errors are likely to overvalue the utility of both S and R. This effect is stronger 
for R, i.e. an individual prefers R to S, because R has a wider range of possible outcomes (and 
hence a higher volatility of errors). However, when the probability mass is shifted to the lowest 
outcome so dramatically that R delivers the lowest outcome almost for certain, an individual may 
prefer S to R. The variance of errors that distort the utility of R converges to zero, i.e. random 
errors almost do not overvalue the utility of R, but they do overvalue the utility of S.  
Notice that according to StEUT, the incidence of the common consequence effect 
decreases if lottery S has the same range of possible outcomes as lottery R. Camerer (1992) finds 
experimental evidence confirming this prediction: when S and R are located inside the 
probability triangle the common consequence effect largely disappears (section 4.6 below). 
Consider now the situation when the probability mass is shifted from the medium 
outcome to the highest outcome. Lotteries S :  and R:  have the same range of possible outcomes, 
i.e. ceteris paribus RS 77 ) . When the probability mass is allocated to the medium outcome 
( pr 1)1 ), lottery S :  converges to a degenerate lottery, i.e. 0+S7 , and hence RS 77 4 . 
When the probability mass is allocated to the highest outcome ( 0)r ), lottery R:  converges to a 
degenerate lottery and hence SR 77 4 .  
In the simplest case when RS 55 )  and RS 77 ) , equation (6) implies that 
! " 5.0)RSprob ! . When RS 77 4  and ! " ! " SSnSS xuxu :::: 141 55 1 , equation (6) implies that 
! " 5.04RSprob ! , i.e. an individual prefers R over S. Thus, when the probability mass is shifted 
to the medium outcome, StEUT predicts that ! "RSprob !  decreases if ! " ! "! " 21SSnS xuxu ::: (45 . 
When the probability mass is shifted to the highest outcome, i.e. ! "SnS xu :: +5 , it was already 
 15
established above that SR 77 4 . Equation (6) then implies that ! " 5.04RSprob ! , i.e. an 
individual prefers R over S. To summarize, when lotteries S and R have the same expected utility 
and the probability mass is shifted from the medium to the highest outcome, StEUT predicts that 
! "RSprob !  may first increase but then it decreases. Thus, theoretically, StEUT is able to 
explain the generalized common consequence effect. Subsection 4.3 below discusses how StEUT 
accommodates the actual experimental evidence of the generalized common consequence effect 
reported in Wu and Gonzalez (1996). 
3.4. Common ratio effect  
The common ratio effect is an empirical observation that there exist pairs of lotteries 
! "rxrxS ,;1, 21 1  and ! "rxrxR GG ,;;1, 31 1 , 32 xx 4  and 10 44 G , such that an individual prefers S 
to R when r is close to unity and the same individual prefers R to S when r is close to zero (e.g. 
Starmer, 2000). According to StEUT, the probability that an individual chooses S over R is given 
by equation (6). For simplicity, utility function is normalized so that ! " 01 )xu  and ! " 03 )xu . 
Equation (6) then becomes equation (9) for a pair of lotteries involved in the common ratio 
effect. 
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Assume that RS 77 )  when r is converges to zero. This assumption is justifiable because 
although R has a wider range of possible outcomes, i.e. ceteris paribus RS 77 4 , R also 
converges to a degenerate lottery faster than does S.  It follows then from equation (10) that  
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xuRSprob ! , and this result does not depend on any 
assumptions about ! "RSprob !  when r is close to unity. In other words, according to StEUT an 
individual prefers R over S when r is close to zero (so that RS 77 ) ), and the same individual 
may prefer S to R when r is close to unity. Subsections 4.5 and 4.9 below discuss how StEUT fits 
the actual experimental evidence of the common ratio effect reported correspondingly in 
Bernasconi (1994) and Loomes and Sugden (1998).   
3.5. Violation of betweenness 
The betweenness axiom states that if an individual is indifferent between two lotteries 
than a probability mixture of these two lotteries is equally good (e.g., Dekel, 1986). Empirical 
studies documented systematic violations of betwenness (e.g. Coombs and Huang, 1976; Chew 
and Waller, 1986; Battalio et al., 1990; Prelec, 1990; Gigliotti and Sopher, 1993; Camerer and 
Ho, 1994). A typical empirical test of betwenness is the following. For two arbitrary lotteries S 
and R and a probability mixture ! " RSM 91(9) GG 1 , ! "1,0%G , an individual is asked to choose 
one lottery from three sets D ERS , , D EMS ,  and D ERM , . Eight choice patterns are possible 
theoretically. Only two of them are consistent with betwenness: RS ! , MS ! , RM ! , 
denoted for simplicity as SSM, and RMR. Choice patterns SMM and RMM indicate that an 
individual likes randomization, i.e. they reveal quasi-concave preferences. Choice patterns SSR 
and RSR indicate that an individual dislikes randomization, i.e. they reveal quasi-convex 
preferences. An asymmetric split between quasi-concave and quasi-convex preferences is taken 
as an evidence of betwenness violation. 
The betwenness axiom is a weaker version of the independence axiom of the 
deterministic EUT (e.g., Dekel, 1986). Thus, deterministic EUT cannot explain the violation of 
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betwenness. StEUT is able to explain such violation as it is demonstrated by one specific 
example below. Consider lotteries S and R such that S and R have the same lowest possible 
outcome, but the highest possible outcome of S is lower than the highest possible outcome of R. 
According to the assumption of StEUT, this implies that RS 77 4  because R has a wider range 
of possible outcomes. Let the expected utility of S be closer to the utility of the lowest outcome 
than to the utility of the highest outcome. Finally, assume for the sake of argument that 
! " 5.02RSprob ! , i.e. an individual prefers S and R. Empirical tests of betwenness employing 
lotteries S and R that satisfy the above assumptions were conducted inter alia by Prelec (1990), 
Camerer and Ho (1994) and Bernasconi (1994). 
When 1+G  a probability mixture M converges to lottery S. In this case S and M have 
similar expected utilities ( MS 55 H ), but MS 77 4  because M has a wider range of possible 
outcomes. ! "MSprob !  is determined by equation (6). Taking into consideration that S5  is as 
close as necessary to ! "Sxu 1  by assumption and following the same argument as described in 
section 3.3 above, it is possible to prove that ! " 5.04MSprob !  if ! " ! "! " 21MMnM xuxu (45 . In 
other words, an individual may prefer M to S although at the same time S is preferred to R, which 
is a violation of betwenness (e.g. Prelec, 1990).  
Intuitively, S and M have almost identical expected utilities, which are close to the utility 
of their lowest possible outcome. In this case, random errors are likely to overvalue the 
stochastic utility of both S and M, but this effect is stronger for M because the stochastic utility of 
M has a higher volatility of random errors. Thus, an individual may prefer M to S and S to R. In 
other words, StEUT predicts a higher incidence of the quasi-concave preferences. Subsections 
4.4 and 4.5 below discuss how StEUT fits the actual experimental evidence of betwenness 
violation reported correspondingly in Camerer and Ho (1994) and Bernasconi (1994).  
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4. Fit to experimental data 
The previous section demonstrated that StEUT is able to explain theoretically all major 
well-known empirical facts. This section explores how StEUT fits the actual empirical data. In 
the following subsections 4.1.-4.9 the same parsimonious parametric form of StEUT is used to 
accommodate the aggregate choice pattern revealed in nine well-known experimental studies. Of 
course, individuals do not share identical preferences. However, a single-agent stochastic model 
is a simple method for integrating data from many studies, where individual estimates have low 
power, e.g. when one subject makes only a few decisions (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994, p.186). 
Such approach is also relevant in an economic sense because it describes the behavior of a 
“representative agent” (e.g. Wu and Gonzalez, 1996). In the subsection 4.10, the parametric form 
of StEUT is estimated separately for every subject using the experimental data from Hey and 
Orme (1994).  
4.1. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) elicited the certainty equivalents of 56 lotteries and found 
strong empirical support for the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. The first column of table 1 
presents 28 lotteries from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) that have only positive outcomes. The 
second column of table 1 presents a median certainty equivalent for every lottery, as elicited in 
the experiment (data are taken from table 3 in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), p.307). For 
comparison, the third column of table 1 presents the certainty equivalents predicted by CPT with 
the best fitting parameters ( 61.0,88.0 )) IJ ) estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
Following the same format, table 2 presents the results of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) for 28 
lotteries that have only negative outcomes. The prediction of CPT in the third column of table 2 
is based on the best fitting parameters 69.0,88.0 )) KL  estimated by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). 
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Lottery 
Elicited 
median 
CE 
CE 
predicted 
by CPT 
61.0
,88.0
)
)
I
J  
CE 
predicted 
by StEUT 
771.0
,775.0
)
)
7
J  
(0,0.9;50,0.1) 9 7.4 7.3 
(0,0.5;50,0.5) 21 18.7 20.4 
(0,0.1;50,0.9) 37 34.0 35.9 
(0,0.95;100,0.05) 14 10.0 8.9 
(0,0.75;100,0.25) 25 24.6 27.6 
(0,0.5;100,0.5) 36 37.4 40.9 
(0,0.25;100,0.75) 52 52.6 55.3 
(0,0.05;100,0.95) 78 76.9 80.6 
(0,0.99;200,0.01) 10 7.4 5.9 
(0,0.9;200,0.1) 20 29.6 29.3 
(0,0.5;200,0.5) 76 74.8 81.8 
(0,0.1;200,0.9) 131 135.9 143.7 
(0,0.01;200,0.99) 188 180.0 183.4 
(0,0.99;400,0.01) 12 14.9 11.8 
(0,0.01;400,0.99) 377 360.1 366.8 
(50,0.9;100,0.1) 59 59.0 60.6 
(50,0.5;100,0.5) 71 70.5 74.0 
(50,0.1;100,0.9) 83 85.2 88.1 
(50,0.95;150,0.05) 64 62.4 63.7 
(50,0.75;150,0.25) 72.5 77.7 84.0 
(50,0.5;150,0.5) 86 90.5 97.0 
(50,0.25;150,0.75) 102 105.3 110.5 
(50,0.05;150,0.95) 128 128.4 133.1 
(100,0.95;200,0.05) 118 112.7 114.3 
(100,0.75;200,0.25) 130 128.2 135.0 
(100,0.5;200,0.5) 141 141.1 148.1 
(100,0.25;200,0.75) 162 155.8 161.4 
(100,0.05;200,0.95) 178 178.7 183.6 
Weighted sum 
of squared 
errors 
0 0.5092 0.6672 
Table 1 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
dataset: actual and predicted certainty 
equivalents for lotteries that have only 
positive outcomes 
 
 
Lottery 
Elicited 
median 
CE 
CE 
predicted 
by CPT 
69.0
,88.0
)
)
K
L  
CE 
predicted 
by StEUT
608.0
,762.0
)
)
7
L
(-50,0.1;0,0.9) -8 -6.7 -5.6 
(-50,0.5;0,0.5) -21 -20.4 -20.1 
(-50,0.9;0,0.1) -39 -37.4 -38 
(-100,0.05;0,0.95) -8 -8.3 -6.6 
(-100,0.25;0,0.75) -23.5 -24.8 -23.2 
(-100,0.5;0,0.5) -42 -40.8 -40.3 
(-100,0.75;0,0.25) -63 -58.8 -59.3 
(-100,0.95;0,0.05) -84 -83.1 -83.8 
(-200,0.01;0,0.99) -3 -5.1 -4.1 
(-200,0.1;0,0.9) -23 -26.7 -22.4 
(-200,0.50,0.5) -89 -81.5 -80.5 
(-200,0.9;0,0.1) -155 -149.7 -152.1 
(-200,0.99;0,0.01) -190 -187.6 -186.5 
(-400,0.01;0,0.99) -14 -10.2 -8.3 
(-400,0.99;0,0.01) -380 -375.1 -372.9 
(-100,0.1;-50,0.9) -59 -58.2 -58.8 
(-100,0.5;-50,0.5) -71 -72.2 -74 
(-100,0.9;-50,0.1) -85 -88.4 -90 
(-150,0.05;-50,0.95) -60 -60.4 -61.1 
(-150,0.25;-50,0.75) -71 -78 -80 
(-150,0.5;-50,0.5) -92 -93.8 -96.8 
(-150,0.75;-50,0.25) -113 -111.2 -114.4 
(-150,0.95;-50,0.05) -132 -134.2 -136.1 
(-200,0.05;-100,0.95) -112 -110.7 -111.7 
(-200,0.25;-100,0.75) -121 -128.5 -131 
(-200,0.5;-100,0.5) -142 -144.4 -148 
(-200,0.75;-100,0.25) -158 -161.7 -165.4 
(-200,0.95;-100,0.05) -179 -184.5 -186.5 
Weighted sum 
of squared 
errors 
0 0.6601 0.4889 
Table 2 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
dataset: actual and predicted certainty 
equivalents for lotteries that have only 
negative outcomes 
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The fourth column of tables 1 and 2 presents the certainty equivalents predicted by 
StEUT in equation (4). For estimation purposes, a subjective utility function is defined over 
changes in wealth exactly as the value function is defined in CPT, e.g. equation (10). 
! "
! ".
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0,
xx
xx
xu L
J
M
 (10) 
where LJ ,  and M  are constant. Coefficients J  and L  capture the curvature of utility function 
correspondingly for positive and negative outcomes. Coefficient M  captures the loss aversion 
(e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995).  
According to StEUT, the standard deviation of random errors is higher for lotteries with a 
wider range of possible outcomes, and it converges to zero for lotteries converging to a 
degenerate lottery. Although many functional forms satisfy these two properties, a parsimonious 
specification (11) turned out to fit the data most successfully. 
! " ! "! " ! "N
)
119)
n
i
inL pxuxu
1
1 177  (11) 
where 7  is constant across all lotteries. Coefficient 7  captures the standard deviation of random 
errors that is not lottery-specific. For example, in the experiments with hypothetical incentives, 
7  is expected to be higher than in the experiments with real incentives because real incentives 
tend to reduce the number of errors (e.g. Smith and Walker, 1993; Harless and Camerer, 1994, 
p.1265). Subsection 4.11 below demonstrates that actual experimental data support this intuition.  
In this section, StEUT is contested primarily against CPT. CPT allows its coefficient 
capturing the non-linear weighting of probabilities to be different for gains and losses. The 
coefficient 7  from equation (11) is also allowed to be different for lotteries that have only 
positive outcomes vs. lotteries that have only negative outcomes. With this extra freedom, the 
parametric versions of StEUT and CPT have exactly the same number of parameters. 
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The certainty equivalents predicted by StEUT in the fourth column of tables 1 and 2 are 
calculated through equation (4) using the functional forms (10) and (11). Parameters LJ ,  and 
7  are estimated to minimize the weighted sum of squared errors ! "*
)
1)
28
1
21
i
i
StEUT
i CECEWSSE , 
where StEUTiCE  is the certainty equivalent predicted by StEUT and iCE  is the certainty 
equivalent elicited in the experiment for lottery # $28,1%i . Non-linear optimization was 
implemented in the Matlab 6.5 package. The program files are available from the author on 
request. The best fitting parameters 775.0)J  and 762.0)L  of StEUT utility function are 
slightly lower than the corresponding parameters of CPT. This indicates a more concave utility 
function for positive outcomes and a more convex utility function for negative outcomes. The 
estimated standard deviation of random errors 7  is lower for negative outcomes than for 
positive outcomes. This can be interpreted that subjects are more diligent (less vulnerable to 
error) when making decisions involving losses.                                                                                                         
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that both the predictions of CPT and StEUT fit actual 
experimental data from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) extremely well. CPT fits better (WSSE= 
0.5092) than does StEUT (WSSE=0.6672) for lotteries that have only positive outcomes. StEUT 
fits better (WSSE=0.4889) than does CPT (WSSE=0.6601) for lotteries that have only negative 
outcomes. For comparison, when the certainty equivalents are calculated through the 
deterministic EUT, WSSE is 3.788 for lotteries that have only positive outcomes, and WSSE is 
3.1958 for lotteries that have only negative outcomes.2 To summarize, StEUT explains 
successfully the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes documented in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
and its prediction is at least as good as that of CPT and it is significantly better than that of EUT. 
                                                 
2 The prediction of the deterministic EUT is calculated using the same utility function as in StEUT, i.e. 775.0)J  
and 762.0)L . In fact, the deterministic EUT is just a restricted version of StEUT when 0)7 . 
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4.2. Gongalez and Wu (1999) 
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) elicited the certainty equivalents for 165 lotteries and found 
evidence consistent with the non-linear probability weighting. The first number in every cell of 
table 3 presents a median certainty equivalent elicited for a corresponding lottery. The second 
number in every cell of table 3 presents the certainty equivalent predicted by CPT with best 
fitting parameters ( 77.0,44.0,49.0 ))) KIJ ) estimated by Gonzalez and Wu (1999). 
The third number in every cell of table 3 (presented in the second line) is the certainty 
equivalent predicted by StEUT. The parametric form of StEUT and the estimation technique are 
the same as described in section 4.1. The best fitting parameters of StEUT are 442.0)J  and 
403.1)7 . The power coefficient of utility function J  is slightly lower than the corresponding 
coefficient of CPT estimated by Gonzalez and Wu (1999). The coefficient 7  is almost twice as 
high for the dataset of Gonzalez and Wu (1999) as for the dataset of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). It is possibly due to a high incidence of weak monotonicity violations (21% of pairwise 
comparisons) in the data reported by Gonzalez and Wu (1999). 
Overall StEUT fits the data from Gonzalez and Wu (1999) better (WSSE is 15.4721) than 
does CPT (WSSE is 17.4612). The certainty equivalents predicted by CPT are systematically 
below the actual experimental data for lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of the 
lowest possible outcome, e.g. columns 2-5 of table 3. For these lotteries, StEUT makes a slightly 
higher prediction and hence it obtains a better result. However, there is clearly room for further 
improvement because even the prediction of StEUT is quite below the actual certainty 
equivalents in the upper left region of table 3. For lotteries whose expected utility is close to the 
utility of the highest possible outcome (e.g. columns 10-12 of table 3), both StEUT and CPT 
make similar predictions. Thus, “noisy expected utility” is at least as successful as the non-linear 
probability weighting in explaining the data from Gonzalez and Wu (1999). 
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Probability attached to the higher outcome Lottery 
outcomes 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.75 0.9 0.95 0.99 
25 and 0 4  0.2 0.2 
4  0.7 
1.2 
8  1.2 
2.4 
9  2.5 
4.1 
10  3.7 
4.8 
9.5  4.6 
5.2 
12  5.6 
5.6 
11.5  7.5
6.5 
14.5  11.0
9.3 
13  13.4 
12.6 
19  18.1 
19.0 
50 and 0 6  0.4 0.4 
7  1.4 
2.4 
8  2.4 
4.7 
12.5  4.9
8.1 
10  7.4 
9.6 
14  9.1 
10.4 
12.5  11.1
11.2 
19.5  15.1
13.0 
22.5  22.0
18.7 
27.5  26.9
25.2 
40  36.2 
37.9 
75 and 0 5  0.6 0.6 
10  2.1 
3.6 
8.5  3.6 
7.1 
14  7.4 
12.2 
17  11.1 
14.5 
16  13.7 
15.6 
18  16.7 
16.8 
23  22.6 
19.5 
36  33.1 
28.0 
31.5  40.3
37.7 
48.5  54.3
56.9 
100 and 0 10  0.8  0.7 
10  2.8 
4.8 
15  4.8 
9.5 
21  9.9 
16.3 
19  14.8 
19.3 
23  18.3 
20.8 
35  22.3 
22.4 
31  30.1 
26.0 
63  44.1 
37.3 
58  53.8 
50.3 
84.5  72.3
75.8 
150 and 0 10  1.2 1.1 
10  4.2 
7.2 
18  7.2 
14.2 
25  14.8 
24.4 
34  22.2 
28.9 
25  27.4 
31.2 
49  33.4 
33.6 
70  45.2 
38.9 
41.5  66.1
56.0 
106  80.6
75.5 
118  108.5
113.7 
200 and 0 6  1.6 1.5 
9  5.6 
9.6 
21  9.7 
18.9 
26.5  19.8
32.6 
34.5  29.5
38.6 
34  36.6 
41.6 
56  44.6 
44.8 
48  60.2 
51.9 
80  88.2 
74.6 
102  107.5
100.6 
158  144.7
151.6 
400 and 0 18  3.1 3.0 
24  11.3 
19.2 
24  19.3 
37.8 
54  39.6 
65.2 
64  59.1 
77.2 
58  73.2 
83.2 
58  89.2 
89.6 
115  120.4
103.8 
208.5 176.3
149.2 
249  215.0
201.2 
277  289.3
303.3 
800 and 0 9.5  6.2 6.0 
42  22.6 
38.4 
36  38.6 
75.7 
90  79.2 
130.3 
91  118.2
154.3 
89.5  146.3
166.5 
207  178.3
179.1 
197.5 240.8
207.6 
404  352.6
298.4 
448.5 430.0
402.5 
519  578.7
606.5 
50 and 25 28  26.9 27.4 
29.5  28.7 
30.6 
30.5  29.9
32.7 
32  32.1 
35.0 
34.5  33.8
35.9 
34.5  34.8
36.3 
37.5  35.9
36.7 
36.5  37.8
37.6 
38  40.8 
40.1 
41.5  42.6
42.5 
41  45.8 
46.6 
75 and 50 56.5  52.1 52.6 
58  54.0 
56.0 
56  55.2 
58.2 
59.5  57.5
60.5 
62  59.2 
61.4 
63  60.2 
61.8 
64  61.3 
62.2 
64.5  63.2
63.1 
64.5  66.2
65.5 
65  67.9 
67.9 
68.5  71.0
71.8 
100 and 50 58  53.9 54.8 
59  57.4 
61.2 
59  59.8 
65.5 
62.5  64.2
70.1 
66.5  67.5
71.8 
70  69.6 
72.6 
78  71.8 
73.4 
82.5  75.6
75.2 
80  81.5 
80.2 
78.5  85.2
85.1 
89  91.6 
93.3 
150 and 50 57  57.0 58.5 
58.5  63.5 
70.4 
71  67.9 
78.5 
79  76.2 
87.5 
89  82.7 
90.9 
84  86.8 
92.5 
92  91.1 
94.2 
99  98.8 
97.7 
121  110.9
107.8 
106  118.5
118.0 
117  131.9
135.4 
150 and 100 114  104.2 105.2 
110  108.0
112.0 
116.5 110.4
116.4 
116  115.0
121.0 
121  118.4
122.8 
125  120.5
123.6 
125.5 122.7
124.4 
131  126.5
126.2 
133.5 132.3
131.1 
130  135.9
135.8 
142.5 142.0
143.7 
200 and 100 111.5 107.8109.6 
115  114.9
122.5 
117  119.6
130.9 
123  128.4
140.1 
131  135.0
143.6 
135  139.2
145.2 
144  143.6
146.9 
146  151.2
150.4 
149  163.1
160.3 
171  170.4
170.1 
158  183.1
186.5 
200 and 150 156  154.3 155.3 
165  158.2
162.3 
160  160.7
166.7 
166  165.3
171.4 
171.5 168.7
173.2 
170.5 170.9
174.0 
176  173.0
174.8 
177  176.9
176.6 
187.5 182.7
181.4 
179.5 186.2
186.1 
190  192.2
193.8 
Table 3 Gonzalez and Wu (1999) dataset: median certainty equivalents of lotteries as elicited in the experiment (first number), 
certainty equivalents predicted by CPT (second number) and certainty equivalents predicted by StEUT (third number)
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4.3. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) 
Table 4 presents 40 decision problems from Wu and Gonzalez (1996). Every decision 
problem is a binary choice between a safer lottery S (presented in the first column of table 4) and 
a riskier lottery R (presented in the second column of table 4). 40 decision problems are divided 
into 5 blocks of 8 problems. In every block, all 8 problems are constructed by shifting the same 
probability mass from the medium to the lowest outcome to test for the generalized common 
consequence effect.  The third column of table 4 presents the fraction of subjects F who choose a 
safer lottery S in the corresponding problem. The data from Wu and Gonzalez (1996) document a 
strong common consequence effect. In all five blocks, the fraction F first decreases and then 
increases when the probability mass is shifted from the medium outcome to the lowest outcome. 
The fourth column of table 4 presents the probability of choosing S over R as predicted 
by CPT. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) calculate this probability using the logistic function proposed 
by Luce and Suppes (1965): ! " ! " ! "! "SVRVeRSprob 1() 11! , where ! ".V  is the utility of a lottery 
according to CPT. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) estimate the best fitting parameters of CPT 
( 0.5022,)J 0.7054)I ) to minimize the sum of squared errors ! "! "
240
1
*
)
1)
i
iii FRSprobSSE ! . 
Minimization of SSE is equivalent to maximum likelihood if errors are distributed normally, e.g. 
Seber and Wild (1989). The fifth column of table 4 presents the probability of choosing S over R 
as predicted by StEUT. This probability is calculated through equation (6) using the functional 
forms (10) and (11). The best fitting parameters of StEUT ( 0.8185.172,0 )) 7J ) are estimated 
to minimize the sum of squared errors SSE. Non-linear optimization was implemented in the 
Matlab 6.5 package (program files are available on request). StEUT fits the data from Wu and 
Gonzalez (1996) slightly better (SSE=0.2183) than does CPT (SSE=0.2419). Thus, StEUT 
explains successfully the common consequence effect documented in Wu and Gonzalez (1996). 
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Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !  
predicted by CPT 
! "RSprob !  
predicted by StEUT
(0,0.93;200,0.07) (0,0.95;240,0.05) 0.62 0.5547 0.5525 
(0,0.83;200,0.17) (0,0.85;200,0.1;240,0.05) 0.46 0.5242 0.5149 
(0,0.73;200,0.27) (0,0.75;200,0.2;240,0.05) 0.39 0.5143 0.5046 
(0,0.63;200,0.37) (0,0.65;200,0.3;240,0.05) 0.35 0.5102 0.5002 
(0,0.48;200,0.52) (0,0.5;200,0.45;240,0.05) 0.53 0.5096 0.4987 
(0,0.33;200,0.67) (0,0.35;200,0.6;240,0.05) 0.47 0.5146 0.5032 
(0,0.18;200,0.82) (0,0.2;200,0.75;240,0.05) 0.53 0.5298 0.5216 
(0,0.03;200,0.97) (0,0.05;200,0.9;240,0.05) 0.61 0.6003 0.6291 
(0,0.9;50,0.1) (0,0.95;100,0.05) 0.58 0.5254 0.5906 
(0,0.8;50,0.2) (0,0.85;50,0.1;100,0.05) 0.51 0.4938 0.5204 
(0,0.7;50,0.3) (0,0.75;50,0.2;100,0.05) 0.44 0.4829 0.4986 
(0,0.6;50,0.4) (0,0.65;50,0.3;100,0.05) 0.43 0.4784 0.4885 
(0,0.45;50,0.55) (0,0.5;50,0.45;100,0.05) 0.48 0.4784 0.4836 
(0,0.3;50,0.7) (0,0.35;50,0.6;100,0.05) 0.46 0.4855 0.4889 
(0,0.15;50,0.85) (0,0.2;50,0.75;100,0.05) 0.49 0.5068 0.5135 
(50,1) (0,0.05;50,0.9;100,0.05) 0.78 0.6654 0.7687 
(0,0.98;150,0.02) (0,0.99;300,0.01) 0.48 0.5202 0.5809 
(0,0.88;150,0.12) (0,0.89;150,0.1;300,0.01) 0.44 0.4824 0.4838 
(0,0.78;150,0.22) (0,0.79;150,0.2;300,0.01) 0.31 0.4758 0.4774 
(0,0.68;150,0.32) (0,0.69;150,0.3;300,0.01) 0.3 0.4731 0.4738 
(0,0.53;150,0.47) (0,0.54;150,0.45;300,0.01) 0.42 0.4721 0.4704 
(0,0.38;150,0.62) (0,0.39;150,0.6;300,0.01) 0.4 0.4735 0.4686 
(0,0.18;150,0.82) (0,0.19;150,0.8;300,0.01) 0.46 0.4814 0.4655 
(150,1) (0,0.01;150,0.98;300,0.01) 0.66 0.6057 0.6156 
(0,0.95;200,0.05) (0,0.97;320,0.03) 0.6 0.5348 0.5661 
(0,0.85;200,0.15) (0,0.87;200,0.1;320,0.03) 0.39 0.491 0.5048 
(0,0.75;200,0.25) (0,0.77;200,0.2;320,0.03) 0.46 0.479 0.4931 
(0,0.65;200,0.35) (0,0.67;200,0.3;320,0.03) 0.4 0.474 0.4875 
(0,0.5;200,0.5) (0,0.52;200,0.45;320,0.03) 0.49 0.4727 0.484 
(0,0.3;200,0.7) (0,0.32;200,0.65;320,0.03) 0.53 0.4799 0.4863 
(0,0.1;200,0.9) (0,0.12;200,0.85;320,0.03) 0.54 0.5133 0.5057 
(200,1) (0,0.02;200,0.95;320,0.03) 0.7 0.6976 0.7633 
(0,0.95;100,0.05) (0,0.99;500,0.01) 0.69 0.5609 0.6848 
(0,0.85;100,0.15) (0,0.89;100,0.1;500,0.01) 0.58 0.4775 0.4821 
(0,0.75;100,0.25) (0,0.79;100,0.2;500,0.01) 0.59 0.4587 0.458 
(0,0.65;100,0.35) (0,0.69;100,0.3;500,0.01) 0.43 0.4512 0.4469 
(0,0.5;100,0.5) (0,0.54;100,0.45;500,0.01) 0.56 0.4487 0.4396 
(0,0.3;100,0.7) (0,0.34;100,0.65;500,0.01) 0.52 0.4579 0.4417 
(0,0.15;100,0.85) (0,0.19;100,0.8;500,0.01) 0.53 0.4829 0.4522 
(100,1) (0,0.04;100,0.95;500,0.01) 0.59 0.6845 0.6014 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.2419 0.2183 
Table 4 Wu and Gonzalez (1996) dataset: the fraction of subjects choosing S over R in the 
experiment and the prediction of CPT ( 0.710.5, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( 0.820.17, )) 7J ). 
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4.4. Camerer and Ho (1994) 
Camerer and Ho (1994) report experimental results on 12 binary choice problems 
constructed to test the betweenness axiom. Every decision problem is a binary choice between a 
safer lottery S (presented in the second column of table 5) and a riskier lottery R (presented in the 
third column of table 5). The fourth column of table 5 shows the fraction of subjects who choose 
a safer lottery S in the corresponding decision problem. The fifth column of table 5 presents the 
probability of choosing S over R as predicted by CPT. Camerer and Ho (1994) use the logistic 
function (e.g. Luce and Suppes, 1965, p.335) to calculate ! "RSprob !  as described in section 
4.3. The best fitting parameters of CPT ( 0.6008,)J .03061)I ), not reported in Camerer and 
Ho (1994), are estimated to minimize SSE, which is equivalent to maximum likelihood 
estimation of Camerer and Ho (1994) if errors are distributed normally. The sixth column of 
table 5 presents the probability of choosing S over R as predicted by StEUT. The parametric 
form of StEUT and the estimation technique are the same as described in section 4.3.  
The best fitting parameters of StEUT that minimize SEE are 0.12420.5215, )) 7J . 
# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (0,0.3;80,0.4;200,0.3) (0,0.5;200,0.5) 0.7093 0.6814 0.6999 
2 (0,0.3;80,0.4;200,0.3) (0,0.4;80,0.2;200,0.4) 0.6512 0.5937 0.6 
3 (0,0.4;80,0.2;200,0.4) (0,0.5;200,0.5) 0.5581 0.5941 0.6039 
4 (0,0.4;80,0.6) (0,0.6;80,0.2;200,0.2) 0.7711 0.7089 0.7438 
5 (0,0.4;80,0.6) (0,0.5;80,0.4;200,0.1) 0.4458 0.6156 0.6259 
6 (0,0.5;80,0.4;200,0.1) (0,0.6;80,0.2;200,0.2) 0.6867 0.6033 0.6051 
7 (0,0.5;80,0.4;200,0.1) (0,0.7;200,0.3) 0.7654 0.692 0.7115 
8 (0,0.5;80,0.4;200,0.1) (0,0.6;80,0.2;200,0.2) 0.6543 0.6033 0.6051 
9 (0,0.6;80,0.2;200,0.2) (0,0.7;200,0.3) 0.5062 0.5964 0.6115 
10 (0,0.66;120,0.34) (0,0.83;200,0.17) 0.9151 0.8822 0.9183 
11 (0,0.66;120,0.34) (0,0.67;120,0.32;200,0.01) 0.1792 0.5315 0.5287 
12 (0,0.67;120,0.32;200,0.01) (0,0.83;200,0.17) 0.9245 0.8685 0.8721 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.1895 0.186 
Table 5 Camerer and Ho (1994) dataset: the fraction of subjects choosing S over R in the 
experiment and the prediction of CPT ( .0310.6, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( 0.120.52, )) 7J ). 
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Both CPT and StEUT explain a revealed actual choice in all decision problems except in 
problem #11 extremely well. Problem #11 is the replication of a hypothetical choice problem 
originally reported in Prelec (1990). Interestingly, problem #11 is the only decision problem in 
which Camerer and Ho (1994) document a strong asymmetric split between quasi-concave and 
quasi-convex preferences when the modal choice is not consistent with the betweenness axiom. 
In all other decision problems where Camerer and Ho (1994) find also an asymmetric split 
between quasi-concave and quasi-convex preferences, i.e. an evidence of betweenness violation, 
the modal choice is, nevertheless, consistent with the betwenness axiom. 
StEUT has only a marginally better fit (SSE=0.186) when compared with CPT 
(SSE=0.1895). Notice that the best fitting parameter 0306.1)I  of CPT is not conventional and 
the conventional parameterizations of CPT, e.g. 14I  would have even worse fit. Thus, StEUT 
explains successfully the violations of betwenness documented in Camerer and Ho (1994). 
However, StEUT does not explain one specific violation of betweenness (#11), when a revealed 
modal choice is not consistent with the betweenness axiom. It is interesting that CPT does not 
explain this particular violation either. 
4.5. Bernasconi (1994) 
Table 6 presents 20 problems of binary choice from Bernasconi (1994) designed to test 
the betweenness axiom3. The format of table 6 is the same as for table 5. The predictions of CPT 
and StEUT are based on the parametric forms and the estimation technique already described in 
section 4.3.  The best fitting parameters of CPT are 0.43880.5728, )) IJ . Bernasconi (1994) 
does not report the fit of CPT to her experimental data. This exercise is done here for comparison 
vs. StEUT. The best fitting parameters of StEUT are 0.27660.2097, )) 7J . 
                                                 
3 Bernasconi (1994) also presents 8 decision problems involving two-stage lotteries. Those problems are not 
considered here because both StEUT and CPT deal with single-stage (reduced form) lotteries. 
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# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (10,1) (0,0.2;16,0.8) 0.94 0.8401 0.8615 
2 (10,1) (0,0.01;10, 0.95;16,0.04) 0.36 0.6714 0.562 
3 (0,0.01;10, 0.95;16,0.04) (0,0.2;16,0.8) 0.88 0.72 0.8069 
4 (10,1) (0,0.19;10, 0.05;16,0.76) 0.9 0.8404 0.8445 
5 (0,0.19;10, 0.05;16,0.76) (0,0.2;16,0.8) 0.8 0.4994 0.5058 
6 (0,0.8;10, 0.2) (0,0.84;16,0.16) 0.54 0.4489 0.553 
7 (0,0.8;10, 0.2) (0,0.81;10, 0.15;16,0.04) 0.06 0.4586 0.5058 
8 (0,0.81;10, 0.15;16,0.04) (0,0.84;16,0.16) 0.72 0.4902 0.5455 
9 (0,0.8;10, 0.2) (0,0.83;10, 0.05;16,0.12) 0.5 0.4501 0.5365 
10 (0,0.83;10, 0.05;16,0.12) (0,0.84;16,0.16) 0.24 0.4988 0.5159 
11 (0,0.2;12, 0.8) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.74 0.4737 0.7528 
12 (0,0.2;12, 0.8) (0,0.21;12, 0.76;20,0.03) 0.04 0.4567 0.5027 
13 (0,0.21;12, 0.76;20,0.03) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.84 0.5171 0.7336 
14 (0,0.2;12, 0.8) (0,0.39;12, 0.04;20,0.57) 0.76 0.4736 0.7384 
15 (0,0.39;12, 0.04;20,0.57) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.1 0.5001 0.5119 
16 (0,0.84;12, 0.16) (0,0.88;20,0.12) 0.36 0.4439 0.5662 
17 (0,0.84;12, 0.16) (0,0.85;12, 0.12;20,0.03) 0.12 0.4538 0.5059 
18 (0,0.85;12, 0.12;20,0.03) (0,0.88;20,0.12) 0.76 0.49 0.5583 
19 (0,0.84;12, 0.16) (0,0.87;12, 0.04;20,0.09) 0.52 0.4446 0.545 
20 (0,0.87;12, 0.04;20,0.09) (0,0.88;20,0.12) 0.26 0.4993 0.5206 
Sum of squared errors 0 1.3609 1.1452 
Table 6 Bernasconi (1994) dataset: the fraction of subjects choosing S over R in the 
experiment and the prediction of CPT ( .4400.57, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( 0.270.21, )) 7J ). 
StEUT fits to the data in Bernasconi (1994) better (SSE=1.1452) than does CPT 
(SSE=1.3609). Notice that problems #1 and #6 as well as #11 and #16 constitute together two 
pairs of common ratio problems. StEUT predicts correctly the common ratio effect: the fraction 
of subjects choosing S over R is much lower in problems #6 and #16 than in problems #1 and 
#11 (the prediction of CPT is less accurate). However, StEUT fails to explain the choice pattern 
observed in problems #7, #12, #15 and #17 (the prediction of CPT is only slightly more 
accurate). These are the problems in which Bernasconi (1994) finds a strong asymmetric split 
between quasi-concave and quasi-convex preferences, i.e. an evidence of betwenness violation, 
when the modal choice is not consistent with the betweenness axiom. We already observed a 
similar predictive failure of both StEUT and CPT in problem #11 from table 5. 
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4.6. Camerer (1992) 
Table 7 (8, 9) presents 9 problems of binary choice between lotteries with large positive 
(small positive, negative) outcomes from Camerer (1992). In every table all lotteries have the 
same range of possible outcomes (lotteries are located inside the probability triangle). The format 
of tables 7, 8 and 9 is the same as for table 5. The predictions of CPT and StEUT are based on 
the parametric forms and the estimation technique already described in section 4.3.  
Camerer (1992) does not find any significant evidence of the common consequence and 
common ratio effects. Thus, deterministic EUT explains the data in Camerer (1992) quite well. 
In tables 7 and 8 the best fitting parametric form of CPT has a coefficient  I  close to unity, 
which signifies a minimum departure from linear probability weighting. Similarly, in tables 7 
and 8 the best fitting parametric form of StEUT has a coefficient 7  close to zero, which denotes 
a minimum departure from the deterministic EUT. Departures from the deterministic EUT are 
more apparent only in choices involving lotteries with negative outcomes, e.g. table 9. StEUT 
fits the data in Camerer (1992) better than does CPT, when lotteries involve small positive or 
negative outcomes. CPT fits better than does StEUT, when lotteries have large positive outcomes.  
# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (0,0.65;10,0.25;25,0.1) 4 (0,0.75;10,0.05;25,0.2) 0.54 0.5793 0.6164 
2 (0,0.55;10,0.3;25,0.15) (0,0.65;10,0.1;25,0.25) 0.58 0.5833 0.6073 
3 (0,0.35;10,0.4;25,0.25) (0,0.45;10,0.2;25,0.35) 0.59 0.5982 0.6003 
4 (0,0.05;10,0.55;25,0.4) (0,0.15;10,0.35;25,0.5) 0.68 0.6575 0.6045 
5 (0,0.05;10,0.5;25,0.45) (0,0.15;10,0.35;25,0.5) 0.67 0.6581 0.6048 
6 (0,0.15;10,0.3;25,0.55) (0,0.25;10,0.1;25,0.65) 0.57 0.6282 0.6073 
7 (0,0.05;10,0.9;25,0.05) (0,0.15;10,0.7;25,0.15) 0.68 0.6062 0.6364 
8 (0,0.35;10,0.3;25,0.35) (0,0.45;10,0.1;25,0.45) 0.59 0.6059 0.6012 
9 (0,0.45;10,0.5;25,0.05) (0,0.55;10,0.3;25,0.15) 0.58 0.5515 0.6048 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.0122 0.0207 
Table 7 Camerer (1992) dataset (lotteries with large positive outcomes): the fraction of 
subjects choosing S over R in the experiment and the prediction of CPT 
( 9988.00.7542, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( 0.08680.5871, )) 7J ). 
                                                 
4 All outcomes of lotteries in table 7 are in thousand USD. 
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# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (0,0.65;5,0.25;10,0.1) (0,0.75;5,0.05;10,0.2) 0.52 0.53 0.5418 
2 (0,0.55;5,0.3;10,0.15) (0,0.65;5,0.1;10,0.25) 0.50 0.5298 0.5384 
3 (0,0.35;5,0.4;10,0.25) (0,0.45;5,0.2;10,0.35) 0.54 0.5305 0.5359 
4 (0,0.05;5,0.55;10,0.4) (0,0.15;5,0.35;10,0.5) 0.54 0.5371 0.5374 
5 (0,0.05;5,0.5;10,0.45) (0,0.15;5,0.35;10,0.5) 0.51 0.5371 0.5375 
6 (0,0.15;5,0.3;10,0.55) (0,0.25;5,0.1;10,0.65) 0.53 0.5335 0.5385 
7 (0,0.05;5,0.9;10,0.05) (0,0.15;5,0.7;10,0.15) 0.58 0.5346 0.5492 
8 (0,0.35;5,0.3;10,0.35) (0,0.45;5,0.1;10,0.45) 0.62 0.5309 0.5362 
9 (0,0.45;5,0.5;10,0.05) (0,0.55;5,0.3;10,0.15) 0.51 0.5282 0.5375 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.0122 0.0115 
Table 8 Camerer (1992) dataset (lotteries with small positive outcomes): the fraction of 
subjects choosing S over R in the experiment and the prediction of CPT 
( 9396.00.4989, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( 0.09140.9123, )) 7J ). 
 
# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (-10,0.1;-5,0.25;0,0.65) (-10,0.2;-5,0.05;0,0.75) 0.39 0.477 0.4105 
2 (-10,0.15;-5,0.3;0,0.55) (-10,0.25;-5,0.1;0,0.65) 0.44 0.4564 0.4093 
3 (-10,0.25;-5,0.4;0,0.35) (-10,0.35;-5,0.2;0,0.45) 0.37 0.4276 0.4107 
4 (-10,0.4;-5,0.55;0,0.05) (-10,0.5;-5,0.35;0,0.15) 0.44 0.42 0.4068 
5 (-10,0.45;-5,0.5;0,0.05) (-10,0.5;-5,0.35;0,0.15) 0.36 0.4247 0.4066 
6 (-10,0.55;-5,0.3;0,0.15) (-10,0.65;-5,0.1;0,0.25) 0.33 0.4399 0.4042 
7 (-10,0.05;-5,0.9;0,0.05) (-10,0.15;-5,0.7;0,0.15) 0.48 0.3944 0.3776 
8 (-10,0.35;-5,0.3;0,0.35) (-10,0.45;-5,0.1;0,0.45) 0.36 0.4379 0.4096 
9 (-10,0.05;-5,0.5;0,0.45) (-10,0.15;-5,0.3;0,0.55) 0.45 0.4306 0.4117 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.0416 0.0262 
Table 9 Camerer (1992) dataset (lotteries with negative outcomes): the fraction of subjects 
choosing S over R in the experiment and the prediction of CPT ( 9945.20.5423, )) KL ) 
and StEUT ( 0.22990.5182, )) 7L ). 
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4.7. Camerer (1989) 
Table 10 (11, 12) presents 14 problems of binary choice between lotteries with large 
positive (small positive, negative) outcomes from Camerer (1989). The problems are designed to 
test the betweenness axiom, the common consequence effect and the fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes. The format of tables 7, 8 and 9 is the same as for table 5. The predictions of CPT and 
StEUT are based on the parametric forms and the estimation technique described in section 4.3.  
Similarly as in the dataset from Camerer (1992), StEUT explains the data reported in 
Camerer (1989) better than does CPT when lotteries involve small positive or negative 
outcomes. CPT fits better than StEUT when lotteries have large positive outcomes. However, 
both CPT and StEUT fail to explain the choice pattern in problems #9 and #12 in table 10, i.e. the 
frequent choice of a riskier lottery R that delivers large positive outcome with a small probability. 
This can be related to the predictive failure of CPT and StEUT in the upper left region of table 3. 
# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (10,0.2;25,0.8) 5 (0,0.1;25,0.9) 0.73 0.7371 0.7976 
2 (10,0.6;25,0.4) (0,0.1;10,0.4;25,0.5) 0.75 0.7437 0.7479 
3 (10,0.6;25,0.4) (0,0.2;10,0.2;25,0.6) 0.79 0.8162 0.7882 
4 (0,0.1;10,0.4;25,0.5) (0,0.3;25,0.7) 0.71 0.6739 0.5769 
5 (10,1) (0,0.1;10,0.8;25,0.1) 0.71 0.727 0.6456 
6 (10,1) (0,0.2;10,0.6;25,0.2) 0.8 0.8005 0.718 
7 (0,0.3;10,0.4;25,0.3) (0,0.5;25,0.5) 0.69 0.6162 0.5983 
8 (0,0.4;10,0.2;25,0.4) (0,0.5;25,0.5) 0.46 0.5557 0.5503 
9 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.5;10,0.4;25,0.1) 0.28 0.5346 0.5305 
10 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.6;10,0.2;25,0.2) 0.75 0.5831 0.5924 
11 (0,0.5;10,0.4;25,0.1) (0,0.7;25,0.3) 0.68 0.6016 0.618 
12 (0,0.8;10,0.2) (0,0.9;25,0.1) 0.27 0.5595 0.5778 
13 (0,0.2;10,0.2;25,0.6) (0,0.3;25,0.7) 0.53 0.5745 0.5363 
14 (0,0.6;10,0.2;25,0.2) (0,0.7;25,0.3) 0.4 0.5536 0.565 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.1996 0.2359 
Table 10 Camerer (1989) dataset (lotteries with large positive outcomes): the fraction of 
subjects choosing S over R in the experiment and the prediction of CPT 
( 6566.00.1617, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( 0.48160.3037, )) 7J ). 
                                                 
5 All outcomes of lotteries in table 10 are in thousand USD. 
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# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (5,0.2;10,0.8) (0,0.1;10,0.9) 0.59 0.5481 0.6698 
2 (5,0.6;10,0.4) (0,0.1;5,0.4;10,0.5) 0.65 0.5517 0.5903 
3 (5,0.6;10,0.4) (0,0.2;5,0.2;10,0.6) 0.64 0.5882 0.644 
4 (0,0.1;5,0.4;10,0.5) (0,0.3;10,0.7) 0.63 0.5687 0.5837 
5 (5,1) (0,0.1;5,0.8;10,0.1) 0.48 0.543 0.5831 
6 (5,1) (0,0.2;5,0.6;10,0.2) 0.58 0.5767 0.6321 
7 (0,0.3;5,0.4;10,0.3) (0,0.5;10,0.5) 0.74 0.5585 0.5903 
8 (0,0.4;5,0.2;10,0.4) (0,0.5;10,0.5) 0.47 0.529 0.5458 
9 (0,0.4;5,0.6) (0,0.5;5,0.4;10,0.1) 0.31 0.5202 0.5504 
10 (0,0.4;5,0.6) (0,0.6;5,0.2;10,0.2) 0.74 0.5458 0.6068 
11 (0,0.5;5,0.4;10,0.1) (0,0.7;10,0.3) 0.76 0.554 0.598 
12 (0,0.8;5,0.2) (0,0.9;10,0.1) 0.46 0.5271 0.5527 
13 (0,0.2;5,0.2;10,0.6) (0,0.3;10,0.7) 0.37 0.5319 0.5421 
14 (0,0.6;5,0.2;10,0.2) (0,0.7;10,0.3) 0.45 0.5284 0.5515 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.1871 0.1639 
Table 11 Camerer (1989) dataset (lotteries with small positive outcomes): the fraction of 
subjects choosing S over R in the experiment and the prediction of CPT 
( 8896.00.5201, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( 0.28970.683, )) 7J ). 
# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (-10,0.8;-5,0.2) (-10,0.9;0,0.1) 0.54 0.386 0.3874 
2 (-10,0.4;-5,0.6) (-10,0.5;-5,0.4;0,0.1) 0.48 0.3789 0.4138 
3 (-10,0.4;-5,0.6) (-10,0.6;-5,0.2;0,0.2) 0.21 0.3411 0.3283 
4 (-10,0.5;-5,0.4;0,0.1) (-10,0.7;0,0.3) 0.21 0.4334 0.3499 
5 (-5,1) (-10,0.1;-5,0.8;0,0.1) 0.27 0.3972 0.3698 
6 (-5,1) (-10,0.2;-5,0.6;0,0.2) 0.20 0.3615 0.2985 
7 (-10,0.3;-5,0.4;0,0.3) (-10,0.5;0,0.5) 0.34 0.4613 0.3587 
8 (-10,0.4;-5,0.2;0,0.4) (-10,0.5;0,0.5) 0.51 0.4821 0.4278 
9 (-5,0.6;0,0.4) (-10,0.1;-5,0.4;0,0.5) 0.33 0.5012 0.3912 
10 (-5,0.6;0,0.4) (-10,0.2;-5,0.2;0,0.6) 0.35 0.488 0.3023 
11 (-10,0.1;-5,0.4;0,0.5) (-10,0.3;0,0.7) 0.51 0.4705 0.356 
12 (-5,0.2;0,0.8) (-10,0.1;0,0.9) 0.40 0.4912 0.2985 
13 (-10,0.6;-5,0.2;0,0.2) (-10,0.7;0,0.3) 0.40 0.474 0.4222 
14 (-10,0.2;-5,0.2;0,0.6) (-10,0.3;0,0.7) 0.40 0.4838 0.4252 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.217 0.1281 
Table 12 Camerer (1989) dataset (lotteries with negative outcomes): the fraction of subjects 
choosing S over R in the experiment and the prediction of CPT ( 6185.00.3882, )) KL ) 
and StEUT ( 0.22520.6207, )) 7L ). 
 33
4.8. Conlisk (1989) 
Table 13 presents 5 binary choice problems from Conlisk (1989). Table 13 has the same 
format as table 5. Conlisk (1989) replicates the Allais paradox in problems #1 and #2. Problems 
#3 and #4 constitute a similar common consequence problem to the Allais paradox; however, 
they do not employ a degenerate lottery that delivers one million for certain. Table 13 shows that 
the incidence of the Allais paradox completely disappears in problems #3 and #4. Finally, 
problems #1 and #5 constitute a variant of the Allais paradox, when a probability mass is shifted 
from the medium to the highest (not lowest) outcome. Table 13 shows that the switch in 
preferences between lotteries S and R across problems #1 and #5 is comparable to that in 
problems #1 and #2 (the original Allais paradox). 
StEUT with the estimated best fitting parameters .85810.5049, )) 7J  explains the data 
in Conlisk (1989) marginally better than does CPT with the estimated best fitting parameters 
6276.00.2241, )) IJ . CPT predicts very well the original Allais paradox; however, it also 
predicts the common consequence effect for problems #3 and #4, which is not found in the data. 
StEUT makes a less accurate prediction for the original Allais paradox but it predicts no 
common consequence effect for problems #3 and #4. 
# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (106,1) (0,0.01;106,0.89;5*106,0.1) 0.5127 0.4989 0.4378 
2 (0,0.89;106,0.11) (0,0.9; 5*106,0.1) 0.1441 0.1743 0.25 
3 (0,0.01;106,0.89;5*106,0.1) (0,0.02;106,0.78;5*106,0.2) 0.4651 0.5248 0.4924 
4 (0,0.71;106,0.19;5*106,0.1) (0,0.72;106,0.08;5*106,0.2) 0.4651 0.3502 0.495 
5 (0,0.01;106,0.11;5*106,0.88) (0,0.02; 5*106,0.98) 0.25 0.292 0.2823 
Sum of squared errors 0 0.0196 0.0195 
Table 13 Conlisk (1989) dataset: the fraction of subjects choosing S over R in the 
experiment and the prediction of CPT ( 6276.00.2241, )) IJ ) and StEUT 
( .85810.5049, )) 7J ). 
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4.9. Loomes and Sugden (1998) 
Table 14 presents 45 binary choice problems from Loomes and Sugden (1998) designed 
to test the common consequence effect (e.g. ## 1-2-4-5-8), the common ratio effect (e.g. ## 1-3-
6-8) and the dominance relation (## 41-45). Every problem was presented to one group of 
subjects twice. The fourth column of table 14 shows average choice of a safer lottery S across all 
subjects and two trials. Table 15 follows the format of table 14 and presents another 45 binary 
choice problems from Loomes and Sugden (1998) that were given to another group of subjects. 
In the experiment of Loomes and Sugden (1998) the subjects were randomly assigned to 
one of the two groups. Therefore, a representative agent may be expected to be the same for both 
groups. The functional forms of CPT and StEUT are restricted to have the same parameters for 
45 problems from table 14 and 45 problems from table 15. For this aggregate dataset the best 
fitting parameters of StEUT are .138300.3514, )) 7J  and the best fitting parameters of CPT 
are 7537.00.4704, )) IJ . StEUT fits the aggregate data (tables 14 and 15 combined together) 
much better (SSE=2.2116) than does CPT (SSE=5.6009). CPT predicts correctly the direction of 
the common consequence and common ratio effects but the effect predicted by CPT is typically 
weaker than the actual choice patterns.  
In problems ## 41-45 from tables 14 and 15 lottery S always dominates lottery R. Actual 
experimental data reveal that subjects respect this dominance relation very well. Lottery S is 
chosen in more than 95% of all cases in problems ## 41-44 and it is always chosen in problem 
#45. CPT embedded in the logistic stochastic utility predicts that S is chosen at most in 57% of 
all cases (e.g. column 5 of tables 14 and 15). Probability ! "RSprob !  predicted by StEUT is 
closer to the observed choice pattern. Nevertheless, StEUT predicts many more violations of 
dominance than are actually observed, especially in problems #41 and #45. 
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# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (10,0.25;30,0.75) (0,0.15;30,0.85) 0.837 0.6446 0.9079 
2 (0,0.15;10,0.25;30,0.6) (0,0.3;30,0.7) 0.8152 0.5613 0.771 
3 (10,0.5;30,0.5) (0,0.3;30,0.7) 0.8804 0.7094 0.9815 
4 (10,0.5;30,0.5) (0,0.15;10,0.25;30,0.6) 0.8587 0.6561 0.8308 
5 (10,1) (0,0.15;10,0.75;30,0.1) 0.6957 0.6103 0.8763 
6 (10,1) (0,0.6;30,0.4) 0.9348 0.7285 1 
7 (0,0.15;10,0.75;30,0.1) (0,0.6;30,0.4) 0.9022 0.6314 0.9896 
8 (0,0.75;10,0.25) (0,0.9;30,0.1) 0.75 0.5125 0.8849 
9 (10,0.2;30,0.8) (0,0.1;30,0.9) 0.8152 0.5977 0.7938 
10 (0,0.1;10,0.8;30,0.1) (0,0.5;30,0.5) 0.837 0.5916 0.9476 
11 (10,1) (0,0.5;30,0.5) 0.7717 0.6564 0.9954 
12 (10,1) (0,0.1;10,0.8;30,0.1) 0.4783 0.5688 0.7407 
13 (0,0.5;10,0.4;30,0.1) (0,0.7;30,0.3) 0.8478 0.5158 0.7738 
14 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.7;30,0.3) 0.8152 0.4824 0.916 
15 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.5;10,0.4;30,0.1) 0.3587 0.4667 0.6634 
16 (0,0.8;10,0.2) (0,0.9;30,0.1) 0.5217 0.4834 0.7379 
17 (10,0.25;30,0.75) (0,0.1;30,0.9) 0.6087 0.5757 0.6743 
18 (0,0.1;10,0.75;30,0.15) (0,0.4;30,0.6) 0.7717 0.5309 0.7453 
19 (10,1) (0,0.4;30,0.6) 0.75 0.5746 0.8807 
20 (10,1) (0,0.1;10,0.75;30,0.15) 0.413 0.5441 0.6289 
21 (0,0.6;10,0.25;30,0.15) (0,0.7;30,0.3) 0.6413 0.4906 0.5839 
22 (0,0.5;10,0.5) (0,0.7;30,0.3) 0.7174 0.4315 0.6937 
23 (0,0.5;10,0.5) (0,0.6;10,0.25;30,0.15) 0.3913 0.4407 0.5938 
24 (0,0.75;10,0.25) (0,0.85;30,0.15) 0.4348 0.4514 0.6221 
25 (10,0.3;30,0.7) (0,0.1;30,0.9) 0.5217 0.5552 0.5384 
26 (0,0.2;10,0.6;30,0.2) (0,0.4;30,0.6) 0.7609 0.4733 0.5324 
27 (0,0.1;10,0.9) (0,0.4;30,0.6) 0.6413 0.4219 0.5615 
28 (0,0.1;10,0.9) (0,0.2;10,0.6;30,0.2) 0.2609 0.4481 0.5181 
29 (0,0.5;10,0.3;30,0.2) (0,0.6;30,0.4) 0.6196 0.4756 0.5158 
30 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.6;30,0.4) 0.5326 0.3966 0.5385 
31 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.5;10,0.3;30,0.2) 0.2935 0.4203 0.5183 
32 (0,0.7;10,0.3) (0,0.8;30,0.2) 0.3696 0.4253 0.5224 
33 (10,0.4;30,0.6) (0,0.1;30,0.9) 0.4565 0.5174 0.2765 
34 (0,0.1;10,0.6;30,0.3) (0,0.25;30,0.75) 0.5 0.4481 0.3229 
35 (10,1) (0,0.25;30,0.75) 0.337 0.4316 0.1203 
36 (10,1) (0,0.1;10,0.6;30,0.3) 0.3043 0.4833 0.3425 
37 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.5;10,0.2;30,0.3) 0.25 0.3828 0.3727 
38 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.55;30,0.45) 0.4565 0.3568 0.3055 
39 (0,0.5;10,0.2;30,0.3) (0,0.55;30,0.45) 0.5 0.4721 0.4444 
40 (0,0.6;10,0.4) (0,0.7;30,0.3) 0.2935 0.3831 0.36 
41 (10,0.25;30,0.75) (10,0.3;30,0.7) 0.9891 0.5208 0.5602 
42 (0,0.55;10,0.2;30,0.25) (0,0.65;10,0.15;30,0.2) 0.9891 0.5702 0.8031 
43 (0,0.8;30,0.2) (0,0.85;30,0.15) 0.9891 0.5536 0.7499 
44 (0,0.1;10,0.75;30,0.15) (0,0.15;10,0.75;30,0.1) 0.9783 0.5675 0.7207 
45 (0,0.7;10,0.3) (0,0.75;10,0.25) 1 0.5273 0.6747 
Table 14 Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset: the fraction of subjects choosing S over R (group 1) 
and the prediction of CPT ( 7884.00.4633, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( .138300.3514, )) 7J ). 
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# Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S 
! "RSprob !
 predicted 
by CPT 
! "RSprob !
predicted by 
StEUT 
1 (10,0.25;20,0.75) (0,0.15;20,0.85) 0.9239 0.6633 0.9712 
2 (0,0.15;10,0.25;20,0.6) (0,0.3;20,0.7) 0.9674 0.5774 0.8455 
3 (10,0.5;20,0.5) (0,0.3;20,0.7) 0.9783 0.7348 0.9984 
4 (10,0.5;20,0.5) (0,0.15;10,0.25;20,0.6) 0.9565 0.6697 0.9123 
5 (10,1) (0,0.15;10,0.75;20,0.1) 0.8152 0.6444 0.9437 
6 (10,1) (0,0.6;20,0.4) 0.9783 0.7929 1 
7 (0,0.15;10,0.75;20,0.1) (0,0.6;20,0.4) 0.9891 0.6788 0.9992 
8 (0,0.75;10,0.25) (0,0.9;20,0.1) 0.9565 0.5489 0.9369 
9 (10,0.2;20,0.8) (0,0.1;20,0.9) 0.9022 0.6203 0.9132 
10 (0,0.1;10,0.8;20,0.1) (0,0.5;20,0.5) 0.9891 0.6548 0.9948 
11 (10,1) (0,0.5;20,0.5) 0.9239 0.7433 1 
12 (10,1) (0,0.1;10,0.8;20,0.1) 0.6957 0.6042 0.846 
13 (0,0.5;10,0.4;20,0.1) (0,0.7;20,0.3) 1 0.5527 0.8822 
14 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.7;20,0.3) 0.9891 0.5558 0.9804 
15 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.5;10,0.4;20,0.1) 0.75 0.5031 0.7376 
16 (0,0.8;10,0.2) (0,0.9;20,0.1) 0.837 0.5199 0.8269 
17 (10,0.25;20,0.75) (0,0.1;20,0.9) 0.7174 0.608 0.862 
18 (0,0.1;10,0.75;20,0.15) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.8913 0.6014 0.9357 
19 (10,1) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.9239 0.6851 0.9967 
20 (10,1) (0,0.1;10,0.75;20,0.15) 0.5761 0.5905 0.7762 
21 (0,0.6;10,0.25;20,0.15) (0,0.7;20,0.3) 0.8587 0.5169 0.6872 
22 (0,0.5;10,0.5) (0,0.7;20,0.3) 0.8804 0.5047 0.8651 
23 (0,0.5;10,0.5) (0,0.6;10,0.25;20,0.15) 0.6522 0.4878 0.6986 
24 (0,0.75;10,0.25) (0,0.85;20,0.15) 0.75 0.4985 0.75 
25 (10,0.3;20,0.7) (0,0.1;20,0.9) 0.7065 0.5967 0.7961 
26 (0,0.2;10,0.6;20,0.2) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.8696 0.5357 0.7651 
27 (0,0.1;10,0.9) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.8261 0.5404 0.9194 
28 (0,0.1;10,0.9) (0,0.2;10,0.6;20,0.2) 0.5217 0.5048 0.6736 
29 (0,0.5;10,0.3;20,0.2) (0,0.6;20,0.4) 0.7609 0.5077 0.6379 
30 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.6;20,0.4) 0.8696 0.4841 0.7933 
31 (0,0.4;10,0.6) (0,0.5;10,0.3;20,0.2) 0.5761 0.4764 0.6515 
32 (0,0.7;10,0.3) (0,0.8;20,0.2) 0.5978 0.4815 0.682 
33 (10,0.5;20,0.5) (0,0.1;20,0.9) 0.5543 0.5559 0.431 
34 (0,0.1;10,0.5;20,0.4) (0,0.2;20,0.8) 0.5326 0.4934 0.4637 
35 (10,1) (0,0.2;20,0.8) 0.5435 0.53 0.3849 
36 (10,1) (0,0.1;10,0.5;20,0.4) 0.413 0.5365 0.4558 
37 (0,0.25;10,0.75) (0,0.35;10,0.25;20,0.4) 0.4674 0.4413 0.4637 
38 (0,0.25;10,0.75) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.6413 0.4285 0.4417 
39 (0,0.35;10,0.25;20,0.4) (0,0.4;20,0.6) 0.4348 0.487 0.4841 
40 (0,0.5;10,0.5) (0,0.6;20,0.4) 0.4457 0.4332 0.463 
41 (10,0.25;20,0.75) (10,0.3;20,0.7) 0.9457 0.5118 0.4733 
42 (0,0.55;10,0.2;20,0.25) (0,0.65;10,0.15;20,0.2) 0.9891 0.5617 0.8174 
43 (0,0.8;20,0.2) (0,0.85;20,0.15) 0.9891 0.5442 0.7499 
44 (0,0.1;10,0.75;20,0.15) (0,0.15;10,0.75;20,0.1) 1 0.5569 0.7207 
45 (0,0.7;10,0.3) (0,0.75;10,0.25) 1 0.5273 0.6906 
Table 15 Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset: the fraction of subjects choosing S over R (group 2) 
and the prediction of CPT ( 7884.00.4633, )) IJ ) and StEUT ( .138300.3514, )) 7J ). 
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4.10. Hey and Orme (1994) 
In the experiment of Hey and Orme (1994) 80 subjects made 100 choice decisions on two 
separate trials. Every decision was a choice between two lotteries with a possibility to declare 
indifference. Using the same functional forms and non-linear optimization technique as already 
described in section 4.3, the parameters of CPT and StEUT are found that fit best to each of 80 
individual choice patterns (aggregated across two trials). The incidences of indifference are 
treated as 50%-50% chance to choose either lottery. For 34 out of 80 subjects the best fitting 
power coefficient J  of the value function of CPT turns out to be zero which indicates the 
violation of outcome monotonicity. These subjects are excluded from further analysis because no 
sensible comparison between StEUT and CPT is possible in this case.  
The data for the remaining 46 subjects are presented in table 16. For convenience, the 
numbering of subjects in the first column of table 16 corresponds to the numbering in the 
original Hey and Orme (1994) study. Columns 2-3 (5-6) of table 16 present correspondingly the 
best fitting parameters of CPT (StEUT) that are estimated separately for every subject to 
minimize his or her sum of squared errors across all 100 choice problems. The median estimates 
of CPT parameters are 873.0,6225.0 )O IJ . The median estimates of StEUT parameters are 
4789.0,7144.0 )O 7J . For every subject the sum of squared errors of the prediction of CPT 
(StEUT) is explicitly presented in column 4 (7) of table 16. The comparison of columns 4 and 7 
reveals that overall CPT and StEUT achieve a very similar fit to the individual choice patterns. 
However, StEUT explains better the choice decisions of 19 subjects and CPT explains better the 
choice decisions of 27 subjects. CPT with median parameter estimates J  and I  also explains 
better the aggregate choice pattern across all 80 subjects (SSE=0.7682) than does StEUT 
(SSE=0.9732). Thus, for Hey and Orme (1994) study the conclusions drawn from the analysis of 
the individual and the aggregate choice patterns appear to be qualitatively similar. 
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Cumulative prospect theory Stochastic expected utility theory Subject # alpha gamma SSE alpha sigma SSE 
1 0.5533 0.8972 5.3208 0.7184 0.4872 5.8456 
4 0.6721 0.8876 4.5633 0.7882 0.4598 4.561 
5 0.5678 0.8433 5.1419 0.6695 0.5537 5.2469 
6 0.5473 0.8158 3.5151 0.6599 0.558 3.5783 
7 0.9137 0.9199 8.4327 1.285 0.3548 8.1172 
9 0.629 1.0234 10.0174 0.807 0.405 10.3516 
10 0.4535 1.8113 5.4517 0.3852 0.3087 5.9505 
11 0.4574 0.8369 2.7523 0.6135 0.5887 2.9329 
12 0.442 0.8464 3.7372 0.5997 0.518 4.1199 
13 0.2138 1.668 6.2414 0.4552 0.3809 7.2378 
14 0.727 0.9167 5.3901 0.8622 0.3981 5.2137 
16 0.2398 1.4418 8.471 0.4656 0.4143 10.3592 
18 0.5618 0.8843 3.3803 0.6552 0.4774 3.5025 
19 0.5544 0.8654 2.3263 0.6733 0.5049 2.446 
20 0.6903 0.9799 8.2491 0.8143 0.3953 8.6262 
21 0.6274 0.8249 5.7729 0.7676 0.5793 5.7606 
22 0.5266 0.8844 3.7732 0.6246 0.5035 3.9335 
23 0.6176 0.8805 3.3674 0.7192 0.4576 3.6012 
24 0.7353 0.7971 11.6094 1.1695 0.6382 10.3412 
25 0.6247 0.8577 6.0376 0.7635 0.5181 6.2026 
28 0.5992 0.7424 5.7855 0.6348 0.659 5.7946 
29 0.6036 0.7438 9.581 0.7118 0.7769 9.3522 
30 0.6317 0.8807 3.7912 0.7169 0.4629 3.7638 
32 0.6108 0.891 5.4559 0.6763 0.4418 5.439 
33 0.8648 0.8854 8.4092 1.255 0.4055 7.8472 
34 0.6738 0.9924 7.5319 0.8606 0.402 7.7794 
35 0.7552 0.5129 6.2454 0.615 0.5538 6.5652 
36 0.6723 1.0013 6.4409 0.7549 0.3687 6.7587 
38 0.2815 0.9412 5.239 0.4764 0.4398 5.7539 
39 0.6589 0.8627 4.088 0.7066 0.4479 3.9757 
40 0.7953 0.9553 5.6457 1.0013 0.3869 5.4089 
50 0.7273 0.903 8.1461 0.8384 0.4032 7.8715 
52 1.0378 0.8266 6.3304 2.3203 0.4737 6.7367 
54 0.7852 0.8509 8.1317 1.0728 0.4725 7.0625 
56 0.597 0.8281 5.4686 0.6893 0.5265 5.6743 
58 0.8268 0.7764 6.6511 1.32 0.672 6.0058 
59 0.5782 1.896 8.7727 0.4157 0.2581 10.0663 
63 0.6978 0.7534 8.4239 0.8517 0.6981 7.9843 
66 0.6956 0.8346 4.7077 0.8046 0.5175 4.5988 
68 0.6816 0.8457 5.2958 0.8269 0.5168 5.2613 
69 0.0809 0.6553 6.7796 0.3437 0.5419 8.1138 
70 0.122 2.2811 8.0005 0.4171 0.4655 10.1323 
75 0.6202 0.6786 6.1171 0.6956 0.9342 5.7462 
77 0.5148 0.6913 6.3225 0.6261 0.7232 6.4113 
78 0.5958 0.9058 4.2415 0.6843 0.4803 4.3726 
79 0.8009 0.813 7.2907 1.0804 0.554 7.1666 
Table 16 Hey and Orme (1994) dataset: the best fitting parameters of CPT and StEUT estimated 
individually for every subject and the sum of squared errors of the prediction of CPT and StEUT 
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4.11. The effect of monetary incentives 
To conclude this reexamination of the experimental evidence, it is interesting to compare 
the best fitting parameters of StEUT across all ten studies that employ different incentive 
schemes to motivate the subjects. Table 17 lists all ten experimental studies that are examined in 
this paper. For every study, table 17 presents the type of incentives used in the experiment and 
the best fitting parameters of StEUT. With the exception of Camerer (1992), all studies that use 
hypothetical incentives have a much higher best fitting parameter 7  of StEUT. This suggests 
that parameter 7  can be interpreted as the standard deviation of random errors that are not 
lottery-specific but rather experiment-specific. The coefficient 7  is lower in the experiments 
that use real incentives and in the experiments that involve negative outcomes. 
Best fitting parameters of StEUT 
Experimental study Type of incentives Power of utility 
function ! "LJ  
Standard deviation 
of random errors 7
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) hypothetical 0.7750 (0.7621) 
0.7711 
0.6075 
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) hypothetical + auction 0.4416 1.4028 
Wu and Gonzalez (1996) hypothetical 0.1720 0.8185 
Camerer and Ho (1994) a randomly chosen subject plays lottery  0.5215 0.1243 
Bernasconi (1994) random lottery incentive scheme 0.2094 0.2766 
Camerer (1992) hypothetical 
0.5871 
0.9123 
(0.5182) 
0.0868 
0.0914 
0.2299 
hypothetical 0.3037 0.4816 
Camerer (1989) random lottery 
incentive scheme 
0.6830 
(0.6207) 
0.2897 
0.2252 
Conlisk (1989) hypothetical 0.5049 1.8580 
Loomes and Sugden (1998) random lottery incentive scheme 0.3513 0.1382 
Hey and Orme (1994) random lottery incentive scheme 0.7144 0.4789 
Table 17 Summary of ten reexamined experimental studies: type of incentives and the best 
fitting parameters of StEUT 
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5. Conclusions 
A large amount of the empirical evidence on individual decision making under risk can 
be explained by a simple model—stochastic expected utility theory (StEUT). According to 
StEUT, an individual chooses among lotteries to maximize their expected utility distorted by 
random errors. Four assumptions about the structure of an error term are the building blocks of 
StEUT:  
1. An error term is additive on the utility scale with utility being defined over changes in 
wealth rather than absolute wealth levels. 
2. An error is drawn from the normal distribution with zero mean which is truncated so 
that the internality axiom holds, i.e. the stochastic utility of a lottery cannot be lower than the 
utility of the lowest possible outcome and it cannot be higher than the utility of the highest 
possible outcome. 
3. The standard deviation of an error is higher for lotteries with a wider range of possible 
outcomes. 
4. the standard deviation of an error converges to zero for lotteries converging to a 
degenerate lottery, i.e. there is no error in a choice between “sure things”. 
Four assumptions of StEUT are appealing intuitively, and they are sufficient to explain 
all major empirical facts such as the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. The 
most important assumption is probably the truncation of the distribution of an error term. It 
implies that the lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of the lowest possible 
outcome are systematically overvalued and the lotteries whose expected utility is close to the 
utility of the highest possible outcome are systematically undervalued.  
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StEUT appears to be a very descriptive model. The reexamination of experimental data 
from ten well-known studies reveals that StEUT explains the observed choice patterns at least as 
good as does CPT. This result suggests that a descriptive decision theory can be constructed by 
modeling the structure of an error term rather than by developing the deterministic non-expected 
utility theories. However, StEUT does not explain satisfactorily all available experimental 
evidence. First of all, individuals value the lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility 
of the lowest possible outcome significantly above the prediction of StEUT (e.g. the upper left 
region of table 3, problems #9 and #12 in table 10). This problem is even more severe for CPT. 
Neilson and Stowe (2002) notice that, despite popular belief, the conventional parameterizations 
of CPT do not explain gambling on unlikely gains (purchase of lottery tickets).  
Second, StEUT does not explain violation of betweenness when the modal choice pattern 
is not consistent with the betwenness axiom (e.g. problem #11 in table 5, problems #7, #12, #15 
and #17 in table 6). CPT does not explain this phenomenon either despite the fact that CPT is 
able to predict such violations theoretically (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994). Third, StEUT predicts 
too many violations of dominance than are actually observed (e.g. problems ## 41-45 in tables 
14 and 15). This problem is even more severe for CPT embedded in the logistic stochastic utility. 
Loomes and Sugden (1998) notice that, in general, a stochastic utility model with an error term 
additive on the utility scale predicts too many violations of dominance. Thus, potentially, even a 
better descriptive model than StEUT (and CPT) can be constructed that explains the above 
mentioned choice patterns. The contribution of the present paper is the demonstration that this 
hunt for a descriptive decision theory can be more successful with modeling the effect of random 
errors. 
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